Chinese Space Weapons

An article on China's history of developing them, and its motivation for doing so:

“Far more than any other country, the U.S. depends on space for national and tactical intelligence, military operations, and civil and commercial benefits,” as Robert L. Butterworth, president of the space consultancy Aries Analytics, recently put it. This “provides a clear incentive for attacking American spacecraft.” Such an attack on American satellites would not have to be very extensive to be devastating—as long as it were well-planned. “Even a small-scale anti-satellite attack in a crisis against fifty U.S. satellites (assuming a mix of targeted military reconnaissance, navigation satellites, and communication satellites) could have a catastrophic effect not only on U.S. military forces, but [on] the U.S. civilian economy,” according to a recent report by China analyst Michael Pillsbury.  [emphasis added]

Three American responses are discussed, with the author concluding that active defense is the best policy:

The chief failing of the diplomatic approach to dealing with the new reality of space weapons is that it is blind to the reason a potential adversary like China would seek access to space in the first place—namely, the desire to be able to inflict a crippling blow against U.S. military and economic might by decapitating its surveillance and communications abilities. Those pushing for a new treaty or a code of conduct have yet to explain why China would abandon capabilities that threaten the “soft underbelly” of American military power. The Chinese regime clearly aspires to develop such capabilities; there is little reason to believe it would negotiate them away.

[...]

The United States should instead adopt an active defensive posture, beginning by expanding and invigorating the research and technical base needed to defend or replenish space assets. In the absence of defensive systems, the United States government would do well to invest in small satellite development and rapid launch capabilities. The combination of the two, once achieved, changes the strategic calculations of prospective adversaries. Instead of achieving strategic surprise by decapitating America’s critical space-enabled weapons, an adversary would only have attained a momentary advantage. Unfortunately, the Air Force and Department of Defense budgets show little intention of investing in these areas.

From a journal called The New Atlantis.  Which sounds a little New Age-y to me, but I guess it's based on a Francis Bacon book written in 1626 about a utopian society coping with the advantages and problems of science and technology.

Hat tip to The Corner.

Comments

[Tom the Redhunter]

I suppose the idea is that we can limit Chinese weapons like we (supposedly) did with SALT I & II, the IRBM treaty of the 1980s, and START. Like the folks at NRO, though, I'm not so sanguine.

Lets talk to them, sure, but let's also take an "active defensive posture" in the meantime.